A taxpayer-plaintiff has no right to insist that the government dispose of any increased revenue it might experience as a result of his suit by decreasing his tax liability or bolstering programs that benefit him…. To the contrary, the decision of how to allocate any such savings is the very epitome of a policy judgment.

The Court’s rationale for its holding on standing can be neatly summarized by one sentence from the Lance opinion: "[A] plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government - claiming only harm to his and every other citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws [of the country], and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large - does not state an Article III case or controversy" over which a federal court can exercise jurisdiction.

The legal doctrine of "standing" tries to identify who the appropriate persons to bring particular kinds of cases are. In particular, Article III of the Constitution allows federal courts to hear only actual "cases and controversies" -- not abstract and fanciful disputes that unaffected parties might want resolved simply to satisfy their curiosity or their morality. Implementing the "case or controversy" idea, the Court has declared that standing must be based on real "injury-in- fact" caused by a defendant’s past or threatened actions.

[Introductory comments noted that "the Framers did not intend for federal judges to roam at large in construing the Constitution and laws of the United States, but rather preferred and provided for resolution of disputes arising in a ‘judicial’ manner." They culminated with the illustration that the courts were not even made available to President George Washington when he sought an advisory opinion regarding a foreign policy concern. Necessary was a "Case or Controversy" with definably adverse parties.]

[J]udicial power extends to…two general groups. In the words of Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia [19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821)]: "In the first, jurisdiction depends on the character of the cause, whoever may be the parties. This class comprehends ‘all cases in law and equity arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority.’ This cause extends the jurisdiction of the court to all the cases described, without making in its terms any exception whatever, and without any regard to the condition of the party. If there be any exception, it is to be implied, against the express words of the article. In the second class, the jurisdiction depends entirely on the character of the parties. In this are comprehended controversies between two or more States, between a State and citizens of another State,’ and ‘between a State and foreign States, citizens or subjects.’ If these be the parties, it is entirely unimportant, what may be the subject of controversy. Be it what it may, these parties have a constitutional right to come into the courts of the Union.’’ [The focus of the instant case, obviously, is only related to the "first" class of cases.]

Judicial power is ‘‘the power of a court to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between persons and parties who bring a case before it for decision’’ [Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911)]. The meaning attached to the terms ‘‘cases’’ and ‘‘controversies’’ determines therefore the extent of the judicial power as well as the capacity of the federal courts to receive jurisdiction. The two terms may be used interchangeably, inasmuch as a ‘‘controversy’’ (if distinguishable from a ‘‘case’’ at all) is so only because it is a less comprehensive word and includes only suits of a civil nature [Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239 (1937)].

According to Chief Justice Marshall, judicial power is capable of acting only when the subject is submitted in a case and a case arises only when a party asserts his rights ‘‘in a form prescribed by law’’ [Osborn v. United States Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819 (1824)]. ‘‘By cases and controversies are intended the claims of litigants brought before the courts for determination by such regular proceedings as are established by law or custom for the protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress, or punishment of wrongs. Whenever the claim of a party under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States takes such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting upon it, then it has become a case. The term implies the existence of present or possible adverse parties whose contentions are submitted to the Court for adjudication’’ [In re Pacific Ry. Comm., 32 F. 241, 255 (C.C. Calif. 1887) (Justice Field). See also Smith v. Adams, 130 U.S. 167, 173 -174 (1889).].

Chief Justice Hughes once essayed a definition, which, however, presents a substantial problem of labels. ‘‘A ‘controversy’ in this sense must be one that is appropriate for judicial determination. A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical character; from one that is academic or moot. The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts’’ [Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 229, 240 -241 (1937). Cf. Public Service Comm. v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 242 (1952).].

Of the ‘‘case’’ and ‘‘controversy’’ requirement, Chief Justice Warren admitted that ‘‘those two words have an iceberg quality, containing beneath their surface simplicity submerged complexities which go to the very heart of our constitutional form of government. Embodied in the words ‘cases’ and ‘controversies’ are two complementary but somewhat different limitations. In part those words limit the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process. And in part those words define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. Justiciability is the term of art employed to give expression to this dual limitation placed upon federal courts by the case and controversy doctrine.’’ [Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 -95 (1968).].

Justice Frankfurter perhaps best captured the flavor of the ‘‘case’’ and ‘‘controversy’’ requirement by noting that it takes the ‘‘expert feel of lawyers’’ often to note it [Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149]. {Such phraseology recalls the classic definition of pornography being, essentially, "I know it when I see it."}

From these quotations may be isolated several factors which, in one degree or another, go to make up a ‘‘case’’ and ‘‘controversy.’’

The presence of adverse litigants with real interests to contend for is a standard which has been stressed in numerous cases, and the requirement implicates a number of complementary factors making up a justiciable suit [Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 251 (1850); Chicago & G.T. Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339 (1892); South Spring Hill Gold Mining Co. v. Amador Medean Gold Mining Co., 145 U.S. 300 (1892); California v. San Pablo & T.R.R., 149 U.S. 308 (1893); Tregea v. Modesto Irrigation District, 164 U.S. 179 (1896); Lampasas v. Bell, 180 U.S. 276 (1901); Smith v. Indiana, 191 U.S. 138 (1903); Braxton County Court v. West Virginia, 208 U.S. 192 (1908); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943); Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 47 (1971)].

A concrete example of the requirement being one of the decisive factors, if not the decisive one, is Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911)… in which the Court struck down a statute authorizing certain named Indians to bring a test suit against the United States to determine the validity of a law affecting the allocation of Indian lands. Attorneys’ fees of both sides were to be paid out of tribal funds deposited in the United States Treasury. ‘‘The judicial power…is the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction….[T]he United States is made a defendant to this action, but it has no interest adverse to the claimants. The object is not to assert a property right as against the government, or to demand compensation for alleged wrongs because of action upon its part.

"The [object] is to determine the constitutional validity of this class of legislation, in a suit not arising between parties concerning a property right necessarily involved in the decision in question, but in a proceeding against the government in its sovereign capacity, and concerning which the only judgment required is to settle the doubtful character of the legislation in question.’’ The Indians obtained the sought-after decision the following year by the simple expedient of suing to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior from enforcing the disputed statute [Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U.S. 640 (1912)]. The principal effect of Muskrat was to put in doubt for several years the validity of any sort of declaratory judgment provision in federal law.

Other cases have involved similar problems, but they resulted in decisions on the merits [e.g., Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76 (1906); La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 455 -463 (1899); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 335 (1966); but see id., 357 (Justice Black dissenting)].

[The essay concludes with a discussion of two particular types of suits; whereas "Collusive and Feigned Suits" are not granted standing, Stockholder Suits may merit it; the key is to discern adverse interests.]

E. Motion to Recommit: After the third reading, but before the Speaker orders the vote on final passage of the bill (or joint resolution), a motion to recommit the bill, either with or without instructions, to the committee which originally reported it is in order (clause 2 of Rule XIX). This motion is traditionally the right of the Minority and gives them one last chance to amend or defeat the bill. The Rules Committee may not report a special rule that denies a motion to recommit with instructions if offered by the Minority Leader or his designee (clause 6(c) of Rule XIII).

If the bill is recommitted with such "forthwith" instructions, the bill is immediately reported back to the House on the spot with the amendment, the amendment is voted on, and the House proceeds to final passage of the bill.

The motion to recommit is the prerogative of the Minority party. In order of priority, the Minority leader and then Minority party Members on the committee handling the bill, by seniority, have the right to offer the motion. They "qualify" to offer the motion if they state that they oppose the bill. The Member who qualifies and offers the motion usually votes against final passage of the bill if the motion to recommit fails.

It is worth noting that a motion to recommit need not instruct that an amendment be adopted. The motion may also direct that further hearings be held, or that an investigation be conducted and that a report of that investigation be made to the House, so long as the instruction is germane to the bill as amended and is in compliance with all other House rules. However, in the case of such general instructions, the committee cannot be required to report the bill back to the House, although it is certainly not precluded from doing so. This is referred to as a motion to recommit "forthwith" with general instructions.

Note: The bill does not disappear into some legislative limbo as some seem to think. It either is killed (by adoption of a straight motion to recommit without instructions) or comes immediately back in amended form (by adoption of the "forthwith" motion to recommit with instructions).

E. Adjournment: A motion to adjourn closes the business of the day. It is wise to check with the Cloakroom and make sure of the time to which the House has adjourned.

The House of Representatives is the People’s House and its legislative process and daily activities should be comprehensible to both its Members and their constituents. We believe this manual will assist in achieving this goal.

D. Powers of the Speaker: The Speaker traditionally opens the session each day but may designate a "Speaker pro tempore," a Member of the majority party, for up to three legislative days. The Speaker or Speaker Pro Tempore may preside through one-minute speeches and other House business (as debate on special rules) until the House resolves itself into the Committee of the Whole, at which time the Speaker appoints a Majority Member to preside as the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole. The Speaker or Speaker pro tempore returns to the Chair when the Committee of the Whole rises.

Note: Rule I of the Rules of the House details the numerous duties of the Speaker, many of which directly affect Members. It is also important to understand the Speaker’s power of recognition under clause 2 of Rule XVII. In most cases, it is the Chair’s prerogative to recognize a Member. The power of recognition cannot be appealed. Under Rule V, the Speaker is responsible for broadcasting House proceedings.

When the Speaker or the Chair announces that the yeas and nays are ordered, or announces that a quorum is not present and the record vote is automatic, it is taken by electronic device. The way in which a Member casts a vote by electronic device is as follows:

Note: Once the record vote ends (by the Chair announcing the result) and other business begins, the vote is final -- no further voting or changing is permitted. However, a Member may submit a statement declaring how the Member would have voted had he or she been present. Such an explanatory statement containing the Member’s original signature will be inserted in the Congressional Record at the point immediately after the vote. A suggested script for such an explanatory statement on missed or mistaken votes may be obtained from the Floor staff. It is important to remember that this statement does not affect whether or how the Member is recorded on the vote.

Exhibit E – Comments posted in response to Mr. DeLay’s essay.

Office of the Parliamentarian - An office managed, supervised and administered by a non-partisan Parliamentarian appointed by the Speaker. This office is responsible for advising the presiding officer, members and staff on the rules and procedures of the House as well as for compiling and preparing the precedents of the House. All consultation with this office is confidential (if requested).

(16) clarification that a motion to adjourn retains its normal privilege and is in order during a call of the House under clause 6 of rule XX….

In the exercise of their constitutional power to determine their rules of proceedings, the Houses of Congress may not "ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House….The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal" [United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892)]. The Senate is "a continuing body" McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 181 -182 (1927). Hence its rules remain in force from Congress to Congress except as they are changed from time to time, whereas those of the House are readopted at the outset of each new Congress.

Where a rule affects private rights, the construction thereof becomes a judicial question. In United States v. Smith [286 U.S. 6 (1932)], the Court held that the Senate’s attempt to reconsider its confirmation of a person nominated by the President as Chairman of the Federal Power Commission was not warranted by its rules and did not deprive the appointee of his title to the office.

In Christoffel v. United States [338 U.S. 84 (1949)], a sharply divided Court upset a conviction for perjury in the district courts of one who had denied under oath before a House committee any affiliation with Communism. The reversal was based on the ground that inasmuch as a quorum of the committee, while present at the outset, was not present at the time of the alleged perjury, testimony before it was not before a "competent tribunal" within the sense of the District of Columbia Code. [Id., 87-90] Four Justices, speaking by Justice Jackson, dissented, arguing that under the rules and practices of the House, "a quorum once established is presumed to continue unless and until a point of no quorum is raised’’ and that the Court, was in effect, invalidating this rule, thereby invalidating at the same time the rule of self-limitation observed by courts "where such an issue is tendered" [Id., 92-95].